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Hard paternalism Submitting to paternalism a person 
whose choice or action is known to be sufficiently 
voluntary to be genuinely hers. 
Interference In this context, an action that may involve 
paternalism because it diminishes or fails to respect 
some liberal value, typically by limiting liberty or violating 
autonomy. 
Libertarian paternalism Designing or mildly affecting 
choice situations in order to promote the chooser’s good. 
Moralism (1) Interference with a person aimed at 
protecting or promoting morality; (2) invoking the promotion or protection of morality as a reason for 
interference with a person. 
Paternalism (1) Interference with a person aimed at 
protecting or promoting her good; (2) invoking the 
protection or promotion of the good of a person as a 
reason for interference with her. 
Soft paternalism Submitting to paternalism 
a person whose choice or action is known not to 
be sufficiently voluntary to be genuinely hers; 
sometimes also interference with a person aimed 
at establishing to what extent her choice or action 
is voluntary. Introduction 
Paternalism is a theoretical concept. It means, roughly,
interference with a person’s liberty or autonomy for her
good. The concept is much disputed, as will be reflected
in this article. Paternalism is opposed by the liberal tradi­
tion, with an early and significant criticism in John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty (1859). 
The Latin root pater suggests paternalism is being or
behaving like a father. However, paternalism does not
refer to all behavior that is typical of fathers toward
their children, but specifically behavior that involves
some form of restraint and some form of benevolence.
The word ‘paternalism’ gained usage in the late nine­
teenth century. It was then mostly used to refer to more
or less strategic benevolence in hierarchical relationships,
such as that between king and subject, factory owner and
worker, and owner and slave (revealing a rather pessimis­
tic view of fatherhood). This use remains to some extent
today. The word is also used pejoratively for government
activity in general and in particular for expansions of
government activity. 
In contemporary moral philosophy, paternalism refers
to benevolent restraint, regardless of power structures. In
that context, no gender distinction is intended by the
term, which could, if we were more open to terminologi­
cal change, be replaced with ‘parentalism.’ The
etymological connection with parenthood and hierarchi­
cal relationships may explain why paternalism is
sometimes thought to involve an attitude of superiority,
signaling that the person acted toward does not know her























 it satisfactorily. Actual psychological attitudes of this sort 
are sometimes taken to define paternalistic behavior. 
Paternalism can also be taken to manifest such attitudes 
regardless of the actual state of mind of the paternalist. 
However, the central aspect of paternalism is the combi­
nation of an action that interferes with some person and a 
reason for that action that concerns the same person’s 
good, regardless of attitudes. Historical Overview 
Paternalism has some historical connection with patri­
archic theories of political power. In the seventeenth 
century, Robert Filmer defended the divine right of 
kings to rule by invoking the ‘right of fatherhood,’ 
which, he claimed, had passed down from Adam to the 
kings and princes of his own time. This theory was 
famously criticized by John Locke by invoking indivi­
duals’ natural right to life, liberty, and property, 
independently of any government. Liberal philosophy 
from Locke to John Stuart Mill emphasized the limited 
right of the state to interfere with individuals. In Mill’s 
mid-nineteenth-century work, individual liberty is 
defended not mainly against monarchs but explicitly 
against democratic government, as well as against 
society more generally. 
Mill’s position in On Liberty is that people should be 
free to do as they like as long as their behavior does not 
harm others. People may be harmed not only by action 
but also by inaction. However, in such matters that 
concern only a person herself and consenting others, 359 
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 society has no right to intervene. Mill is mainly con­
cerned with social as opposed to individual paternalism, 
although not only with the law but also with public 
opinion, which he argues can be as invasive as political 
oppression. 
Mill’s arguments are in part practical. He claims that 
every person knows best what is in her interest and is 
most concerned to promote that interest. He argues that 
making one’s own choices tends to develop one’s char­
acter. He calls for experiments in living, which enrich our 
collective view of the possible and so promote all our 
well-being. However, there is also a perfectionist streak in 
Mill. He embraces the values of development and indivi­
duality, which he sees as fundamental aspects of well­
being. Underpinned by these value commitments, Mill’s 
liberty principle is not easily set aside by practical 
circumstances. 
The contemporary discussion on paternalism was ignited 
by the debate between Patrick Devlin and H. L. H. Hart 
following the 1957 report of the UK Wolfenden committee, 
which recommended that homosexual behavior between 
consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal 
offense. Devlin was critical of this recommendation, arguing 
that homosexual acts harm the moral fabric of society and 
can in the long term lead to its disintegration. Hart, support­
ing the recommendation, argues that Devlin’s unacceptable 
legal moralism must be distinguished from acceptable legal 
paternalism. In defending paternalism, Hart argues that Mill 
was overly optimistic in assuming that individuals are the 
best judges of their own interest and act accordingly. He 
points to inadequate attention to consequences, transitory 
desires, inner psychological compulsion, and subtle manip­
ulation by others. Such obstacles to fully voluntary choice 
have since been at the heart of discussions on paternalism. 
Following the Hart–Devlin debate in the 1960s, the 
1970s and 1980s saw considerable philosophical debate 
both on the nature of paternalism and on its moral status. 
Among contemporary works, Joel Feinberg’s Harm to Self 
is arguably the most influential. Feinberg defends a 
Millian anti-paternalism but develops the restriction to 
competent and informed agents that Mill only hints at. He 
calls the resulting principle ‘‘soft paternalism’’ because it 
allows benevolent restriction of insufficiently voluntary 
choice. 
After the outburst of articles and books on the topic 
in the 1980s, there was a lull in the discussion on 
paternalism until it again intensified during approxi­
mately the past decade. Philosophers such as Richard 
Arneson and  Peter de Marneffe have questioned the
prevailing and, in their view, extreme resistance to all 
forms of benevolent restraint of voluntary choice. 
Meanwhile, drawing on research in behavioral econom­
ics, the economist Richard Thaler and the legal scholar 
Cass Sunstein have defended what they call ‘‘libertarian 
paternalism’’ – promoting healthy choice by conscious design of choice situations, allegedly without limiting 
liberty. More typical libertarians, of course, continue to 
oppose all forms of government benevolence. Liberals 
of all types tend to be anti-paternalists in the sense that 
they hold paternalism to be at least prima facie wrong – 
that is, typically wrong, although perhaps acceptable in 
some circumstances. Normative and Nonnormative Definitions 
Philology aside, we are interested in paternalism because 
of its normative properties, most typically the claim that 
paternalism is always prima facie wrong or, similarly, that 
the fact that an action involves paternalism is always a pro 
tanto reason against performing that action or judging it 
to be justified. However, we may or may not define 
paternalism in normative terms. Nonnormative defini­
tions must specify such terms as ‘interference’ and ‘good’ 
without using normative terms. Normative definitions 
can allow that these terms are specified by what exactly 
is, allegedly, prima facie wrong with paternalism. 
Philosophers disagree on what is best. 
A nonnormative definition makes it possible to agree 
on what paternalism is without necessarily agreeing on its 
moral status. This is an advantage if we want to use the 
term paternalism to describe the world without getting 
into normative questions. Once defined, we can then 
argue about the moral status of paternalism. Because a 
nonnormative definition does not track moral sentiments, 
however it is very likely that it will exclude some actions 
that are opposed on typically anti-paternalist grounds and 
include some actions that are not opposed on such 
grounds. As a result, argument about the moral status of 
paternalism will likely be futile. 
We get a normative definition if we take the anti-
paternalist opposition as our starting point and define 
paternalism as that which this opposition is aimed at. 
The advantage of this approach is that we may avoid 
complex nonnormative conceptual issues and engage 
directly the more pressing matter of what exactly is 
claimed to be prima facie wrong and whether or not this 
claim is convincing. Paternalistic Actions and Paternalistic 
Reasons 
Normally, the label paternalistic is attached to actions or 
policies. We think of laws, medical practices, or private 
actions as being potentially paternalistic. This is also how 
philosophers normally define the concept. Definitions 
typically include the following: 
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action that may be paternalistic, most often excluding 
nonintrusive actions such as greeting someone in the 
street (when this is not a sign to fellow paternalists to 
capture the person and force her to be more prudent). 
2. A consent condition that limits paternalistic actions 
to such actions as have not been consented to – excluding 
actions that are performed in response to explicit consent 
and possibly also tacit and inferred consent. 
3. A benevolence condition that limits paternalistic 
actions to such actions as are motivated, and perhaps 
also justified, by the good of the person(s) interfered with 
Very often, there is also the following: 
4. A superiority condition that restricts paternalism to 
such actions as are performed by an agent who considers 
herself in some way superior to the person(s) interfered 
with. 
On some accounts, interference with substantially non-
voluntary behavior cannot be paternalistic. Most often, 
however, such interference (when benevolent and not 
consented to) is called soft paternalism. For this and 
other reasons, voluntariness should not be considered a 
necessary condition of paternalistic actions. Voluntariness 
is further discussed later. 
The four conditions are specified in different ways by 
different authors, giving rise to a plethora of definitions. 
The three major conditions, conditions 1–3, are discussed 
in the following three sections, and superiority is dis­
cussed briefly in the section titled Anti-Paternalism. In 
the short definitions of paternalism in the glossary, con­
ditions 1 and 2 have been integrated into the single 
concept of interference, and condition 4 has been omitted. 
There are two definitions of paternalism (and moralism) 
in the glossary because there is an alternative to attaching 
the label paternalistic to actions. 
The standard approach is to take for granted that what 
should be defined is paternalistic action. This approach is 
convenient because we are often interested in judging the 
moral status of actions. However, some philosophers 
claim that paternalism has more to do with reasons than 
with actions. They point to the fact that there may be 
multiple rationales for any given action, making it diffi­
cult to state when an action is motivated or justified by the 
protection or promotion of a person’s good. For example, 
one reason for prohibiting drunk driving is that it will 
reduce risks for drunk drivers, a typically paternalistic 
rationale. However, another important reason for this 
policy is that it will reduce risks to other road users, a 
typically nonpaternalistic rationale. It may therefore be 
difficult to determine if the policy as such is paternalistic. 
One possible reaction to the prevalence of multiple 
rationales is to define paternalism not in terms of actions 
but instead in terms of the invocation of reasons for actions. This leads to the second, alternative definition 
in the glossary. On such more reason-focused definitions, 
condition 3 defines a type of reason and conditions 1 and 
2 (and 4) define a type of action. Paternalism is the 
invocation of such reasons for such actions. In other 
words, with this move the components remain the same, 
but the way they are related to one another changes. 
Opposition to paternalism on reason-focused accounts is 
not opposition to any particular action or policy but, 
rather, opposition to counting certain reasons for an 
action or policy as valid or good reasons. Interference 
Paternalism can be described on a more general level as a 
value conflict between some liberty value and some other 
value, where both values concern the same person or 
group. In the typical, individual case, limiting one per­
son’s liberty promotes some other value for her, such as 
her physical, economic, or moral well-being. As Mill 
recognized, we may certainly try to affect people, for 
their good, by noninterfering means such as reasoned 
argument (in most circumstances). Indeed, Mill had no 
problem with sin taxes either, as long as the revenue was 
needed for government essentials. Why then may we not 
promote people’s good by slightly more interfering 
means? Defining interference, and so the limits of bene­
volence, is an unavoidable and difficult task for anyone 
who takes a general stand on paternalism. Liberty and Autonomy 
Liberty is most typically understood as the availability of 
an adequate range of options. Limitation of liberty can 
then be understood as the restriction of this range by the 
exclusion of some alternatives. This view fits well with 
typical cases of paternalism such as the prohibition of 
certain activities – for example, recreational drug use or 
driving without a seat belt. However, the view would 
seem to exclude other typical cases, such as mercy killing 
and treating an unconscious person in conflict with her 
preferences or values, for example, by transfusion of blood 
to an unconscious Jehovah’s witness (whose religion for­
bids such procedures). If we understand limiting liberty as 
restriction of choice, therefore, we must either accept that 
such actions are not paternalistic or accommodate them 
by somehow extending the meaning of ‘choice.’ 
Autonomy is most typically understood as self-deter­
mination, and so violation of autonomy may, in the 
context of paternalism, be understood as substitution of 
a person’s judgment or agency, where the paternalist 
judges or acts in place of the subject. Substitution of 
judgment is more common in the literature, in the sense 
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place when the subject prefers some option but fails to act 
on this judgment for some reason, such as lack of deter­
mination or weakness of will. The substitution strategy 
can accommodate cases in which the subject is affected in 
other ways than having her options restricted. On the 
other hand, it may seem to exclude cases in which some, 
perhaps marginal, options are restricted, but the person is 
left to decide and act among the remainder. Substitution 
must therefore be understood broadly to include partial 
restrictions that do not amount to full substitution of 
judgment in the normal sense of the term. Alternatively, 
interference can be defined disjunctively as substitution of 
judgment or restriction of choice. 
The restriction of choice and the substitution of judg­
ment (or agency) strategies together account for many 
proposed specifications of interference in the literature. 
However, they share a common weakness. People may 
well wish to choose and make judgments concerning 
things that principally concern others and so are not 
under their legitimate control. Both strategies must there­
fore presuppose that the restriction or substitution takes 
place within an area of legitimate control where the 
person’s choice, judgment, or agency should be decisive. 
Only within this area can restriction or substitution be 
interference. The so-called private sphere is sometimes 
thought to be such an area. The private sphere is suppo­
sedly that area of life or conduct which affects only the 
subject herself and consenting others. However, almost 
any part of a person’s life has some effect on nonconsent­
ing others. Moreover, the mere fact that some conduct 
does not affect nonconsenting others does not imply that 
it should not be restricted in order to protect the subject 
herself, who is indeed affected. The delimitation of an 
area of legitimate control is therefore largely an unsolved 
puzzle. In the face of this puzzle, one option is to refer 
the matter to some more general moral theory and so 
strip paternalism of independent moral importance. For 
example, paternalism could be understood as wronging 
someone for her good, whatever wronging is according to 
the correct moral theory. Another option is to retreat to 
the general liberal notions of interference with liberty or 
violation of autonomy, vague as they are, or look to other 
specifications of these notions. Libertarian Paternalism 
In discussions of so-called libertarian paternalism, the 
interference condition has allegedly been lifted. It is not 
interference, the thinking goes, to adjust a choice situation 
so that it promotes the chooser’s interests, as long as he is 
free to make his own choice in that situation. In response, 
it may be thought that choice situations should support 
chooser preference. However, people very often have no 
preference independently of the choice situations they face. The way information is presented, the context in 
which the decision is made, and what the default option is 
all tend to have a very strong influence on choice, even 
when all alternatives are readily available. These effects 
have been noted in preferences over everything from 
medical treatment to retirement savings plans. 
People may possibly have preferences over choice 
situations, but the same indeterminacy may just as well 
reappear on this meta-level. Very often, therefore, neither 
preferences over alternatives nor preferences over the 
way alternatives are presented can determine what choice 
situations should look like. Even when people do have 
well-defined preferences over choice situations, it is not 
clear that it would be an interference if these preferences 
are not treated as decisive, especially so because choice 
situations must often have the same structure for every­
one in a certain group (e.g., patients at the hospital, 
employees at the company, and customers at the cafe­
teria). I return to this aspect of group cases later. If 
libertarian paternalism is truly noninterfering, it is not a 
form of paternalism in the normal sense of the word. 
Paternalism should be distinguished from the wider 
notion of benevolence. 
The rationale for libertarian paternalism is that it is 
better to promote good choice than to leave matters to 
chance. Of course, there may be other reasons to design 
choice situations in certain ways, such as the designer’s 
self-interest. When there are no conflicting interests, 
however, truly libertarian paternalism can be opposed 
only by citing side effects, such as the standard argument 
that power corrupts – in this case, the power to design 
choice situations. Sometimes, libertarian paternalism is 
supposed to allow not only that necessary features of 
choice situations, such as setting the default option, are 
manipulated or designed but also that small or even sub­
stantial costs are imposed on choosing certain alternatives. 
This, however, clearly approaches standard, interfering 
paternalism because there is no clear distinction between 
imposition of costs and outright prevention. Consent 
If a person gives her genuine consent to some action that 
interferes with her for her good, she is not a target of 
paternalism. For example, I can consent to medical pro­
cedures that would clearly have been intrusive were it not 
for my consent. Forcing (old or confused) people to take 
their medicine against their will is paternalistic, but even 
cutting a person open and removing some of his organs 
may not be – if he has given his consent. This condition 
may be considered an instance of the old Roman formula 
Volenti non fit injuria – to a willing person, no harm is done. 
Explicit consent should not be confused with different 
forms of hypothetical consent, which are not consent in a 
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by uttering the words ‘‘I consent’’ or even be verbal. In 
some circumstances, silent and tacit consent can be 
inferred from the circumstances. The consent, however, 
must be genuine – that is, voluntary. The same standard 
can be applied to the voluntariness of consent as to the 
voluntariness of actions, to be discussed later. 
Normally, there is a delay between the giving of 
consent and the action that is consented to. This raises 
the possibility that the person may change her mind. In 
research contexts, for example, it is established practice 
that subjects have the right to withdraw from a study at 
any time. On the other hand, we often have reason to 
restrict our future options, for example to help ourselves 
resist temptation. In an often cited example of consent, 
Odysseus asked his sailors to tie him to the mast when 
they approached the Sirens’ island in order that he 
would hear their singing without risking his ship or his 
life trying to reach the island. Once the singing started, 
Odysseus clearly wanted his sailors to untie him. 
However, Odysseus had foreseen his own reaction and 
specifically instructed the sailors not to listen to his 
future self. The sailors’ refusal to untie Odysseus is 
therefore not considered a case of paternalism, or is 
considered a special case – self-paternalism. It is an 
open and difficult question, however, in what circum­
stances and in what time frame a person may restrain her 
future self and when others may help a person to do so. 
A related question concerns the possible scope of con­
sent – whether consent must be specific to certain 
situations or whether it can be more open-ended. It 
seems we can consent to someone else directing parts of 
our life for us, for example, by hiring a professional to 
manage our finances. Such consent can normally be 
revoked at any time. However, consent can be both 
wide in scope and future-oriented. For example, we can 
appoint someone to be the guardian of our interests if we 
become incapacitated and later be unable to revoke that 
appointment. If such consent is valid, our guardian can 
interfere with us for our good without engaging in 
paternalism. 
When a person becomes unconscious or otherwise 
incapacitated and has not made prior arrangements, we 
face another sort of difficulty. No consent can be given, 
but we can make educated guesses concerning what the 
person would have chosen if he or she were capable, based 
on the available facts, including the person’s earlier 
decisions and behavior. Such an estimated consent is 
sometimes called ‘individual hypothetical consent’ and 
is, although hypothetical and not strictly a form of con­
sent, likely to be in harmony with the person’s values. 
This should be distinguished from ‘reasonable man 
hypothetical consent,’ which estimates what a rational 
and informed person would choose in the person’s circumstances, with no regard for the person’s specific 
character and preference. 
Both kinds of hypothetical consent are sometimes 
argued to preclude paternalism even for conscious, 
mature, and healthy individuals who merely have got 
the facts wrong by human error or reasonable mistake. 
For example, this is Mill’s solution to the apparently 
paternalistic and acceptable action of restraining someone 
who is about to severely harm himself. If someone risks 
harm by unknowingly crossing an unsafe bridge, Mill 
reasons, it is not even an interference to physically 
restrain her. This makes sense because there are many 
cases in which people would simply be grateful for being 
prevented from making dangerous mistakes. However, 
invoking hypothetical consent whenever someone does 
not anticipate the full consequence of her action would 
open the door to a wide range of interferences, certainly 
more so than Mill would have been prepared to accept. 
So-called ‘subsequent consent’ is not a form of consent 
either but, rather, refers to expressing a positive attitude 
to something that has already happened. Unless a person 
has undergone great changes, however, subsequent con­
sent is an indication, after the fact, that the person would 
have consented had she been able. Proxy consent is not 
consent by the person in question but, rather, by another 
person who, perhaps temporarily, acts as the person’s 
guardian, without her consent. Parents are generally 
allowed to give proxy consent for their children, although 
only within boundaries. 
Depending on how interference is specified, it may be 
that there is no such thing as consenting to interference. In 
other words, just as consent precludes harm in some legal 
contexts, it may preclude interference. If so, the consent 
condition and the interference condition are integrated, 
with consent one factor determining whether or not an 
action is interfering. Indeed, a possible specification of 
interference is ‘to affect matters that are under some 
person’s legitimate control, without her consent.’ Benevolence 
Paternalism is always benevolent in some sense. 
Normally, this benevolence is directed at the person 
who is interfered with or affected. In so-called ‘impure’ 
cases of paternalism, however, the interference is pri­
marily directed at someone other than the benefactor. 
For example, when a prohibition forbids the sale of 
recreational drugs, the supposed benefactor is the 
buyer, but the primary target for interference is the 
seller. Even in impure cases, however, there is arguably 
some interference with the benefactor, who is prevented 
from doing what he wants to do or getting what he 
wants to get, though indirectly. Interfering with con­
sensual interactions must be distinguished from 
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harm or provide benefit to third parties: Preventing a 
robbery for the good of the victim is not a case of 
impure paternalism. 
On most definitions of paternalism, the benevolence 
is supposed to be first and foremost a psychological 
motive for the interference. This means that actions 
can involve paternalism even if they do not in fact 
benefit the person interfered with in any way, as long 
as the agent believes that such benefit is forthcoming. 
The focus is on the agent; assessments of the situation 
by third parties cannot be paternalistic (unless they 
amount to interference in their own right). 
Alternatively, the benevolence may lie on the level of 
justification. This means that actions can be evaluated 
independently of motives. If so, policies and laws can 
involve paternalism in force of their (alleged and/or 
actual) rationale, regardless of why exactly they were 
first instigated and enacted. Arguably, both motives and 
justifications can be paternalistic, and thus definitions 
should ideally accommodate both kinds of reasons. Mixed Cases 
Benevolence may or may not be the only reason for an 
interfering action. When benevolence is only part of the 
rationale, we have a ‘mixed case.’ As mentioned pre­
viously, paternalism may be defined either in terms of 
actions or in terms of reasons for action. Mixed cases pose 
no theoretical difficulty for reason-focused accounts, 
which are partly proposed as a way of dealing with such 
cases. If paternalism is the invocation of benevolence as a 
reason for interference, this is quite independent of 
whether or not other reasons are also invoked for the 
same interference. The interference as such cannot be 
paternalistic on reason-focused accounts. 
Action-focused accounts, on the other hand, must 
somehow set a standard for which mixed cases, if any, 
qualify as paternalism. There are two main strategies. The 
first is to draw a line for how important the benevolent 
reason must be in the total set of reasons for an action to 
be paternalistic. Benevolence may most typically be 
required to be the only reason, the main reason, or a 
necessary reason in some sense. The second strategy is 
to make the benevolence condition apply gradually so 
that interferences are paternalistic to the degree that 
their rationale is benevolence. This may be understood 
either relative to the strength of other reasons for the 
interference or independently in terms of the absolute 
strength of the benevolence reason. The specification of 
paternalistic actions in mixed cases is further complicated 
by the fact that reasons may be either motives or 
justifications. In other words, the prevalence of mixed cases make 
fully developed action-focused accounts very complex. 
It is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to take proper 
account of the moral importance of all other kinds of 
reasons for action while opposing certain actions 
because they are partly motivated and/or justified by 
benevolence. Reason-focused accounts, on the other 
hand, although well suited to deal with mixed cases, 
are complex in their own right, with their refusal to 
label actions as either paternalistic or nonpaternalistic. 
Perhaps this is the reason why most authors prefer to 
stick with action-focused accounts and deal only with 
unmixed cases. Theories of the Good 
Strictly speaking, paternalism is independent of con­
flicting theories of the good. Paternalism is interfering 
with a person for her good, regardless of what that good 
consists of exactly. However, which theory of the good 
one adopts affects how much room there is for patern­
alism. On subjectivist theories of the good, something 
can only be good for a person if she finds it good. If 
such a theory is correct, benevolent interference with a 
person can only be efficient in cases in which she fails 
to bring about what she finds good or even allow that 
others bring it about. Such cases are not uncommon, 
however. For example, a person may agree that coer­
cive treatment would do her more good than harm and 
yet decline to consent to such treatment out of fear or 
because she is more concerned to spare her family the 
expense. Furthermore, a person may be mistaken about 
what means would contribute to her ends and so resist 
taking them. On less subjectivist theories of the good, 
something can be good for a person even though she 
does not find it so, leaving even more room for 
paternalism. 
In the literature, paternalism is often associated with 
objectivist theories of the good. This may be because 
justifying an interference with a person aimed at promot­
ing some end that she does not endorse requires both an 
objectivist theory of the good and acceptance of patern­
alism. In that sense, the two are bedfellows. As we have 
seen, however, paternalism is consistent with subjectivist 
theories of the good. It does not require disregard for a 
person’s view of her good. 
A presumptive paternalist may of course fail to do 
good because she is confused or mistaken about the ben­
efits of her interference. The mistake may be either 
practical (her interference will not bring about what she 
aims to bring about) or normative (what her interference 
brings about is not good). In either case, her interference 
is pointless and trivially undesirable. 
Paternalism 365 Moralism and Types of Good 
The good that benevolent reasons concern or refer to can 
be of any kind. Most typically, the good is physical health 
or survival. Paternalism may also aim to promote people’s 
finances, such as by mandatory retirement savings, or to 
protect a person’s autonomy or promote her future lib­
erty, such as by coercive drug rehabilitation or intrusive 
dissemination of information. A category of special inter­
est is moral and religious paternalism, which aims to 
protect or promote some person’s soul or virtue. For 
example, missionaries have often forced people to take 
part in religious services in order to save their souls from 
eternal damnation, and prohibitions on relatively harm­
less recreational drugs may be aimed at protecting 
people’s good character from deteriorating into passivity 
or excessive creativity. 
Moral paternalism should be distinguished from mor­
alism, which is interference aimed at protecting or 
promoting morality in general, independently of any 
individual’s virtue. Cursing may be thought to blemish a 
person’s soul or character, but it may also be thought to 
make the world an uglier place. Less benevolent mission­
aries may try to save the heathens not for their own sakes 
but, rather, for the greater glory of God and his kingdom 
on earth. The government may prohibit gay soldiers from 
announcing their sexual preference not for their own 
sakes but, rather, in service to the nation’s pride and 
purity. As shown by the latter example, arguments for 
moralism may overlap with arguments for the preserva­
tion or protection of society. If (implausibly) the essence 
of some society depends for its preservation on some set 
of general conduct or opinion, a shift away from that 
conduct or opinion would spell the end of that society. 
More practically, social trust is a common asset and if 
certain behavior damages this trust, perhaps without 
directly harming any one individual, interference with 
such behavior may be motivated by the protection of all 
in some sense, rather than by the preservation of morality 
as such. Such potential overlap can make it difficult to 
distinguish moralism from paternalism in practice, 
although they are quite distinct in theory. Voluntariness 
Some behavior is so much an effect of forces external to 
an agent that it can be questioned whether it is in any 
real sense her behavior – it is substantially involuntary. 
Reflexes and sleepwalking are obvious cases, but also 
actions performed under heavy intoxication, complete 
ignorance, or extreme time pressure may qualify. Some 
human beings cannot act voluntarily at all, such as 
infants and some severely developmentally disabled. 
Interference with substantially involuntary behavior is often called soft paternalism and is generally considered 
acceptable. (To complicate matters, some authors, espe­
cially economists, use the term soft paternalism quite 
differently to refer to paternalism where the interference 
is mild.) Naturally, interference with involuntary beha­
vior can be morally problematic if it is harmful or 
unkind but not simply because it is benevolent, not 
consented to, and perhaps done with a (very reasonable) 
sense of superiority. 
Depending on one’s preferred definition of paternal­
ism, soft paternalism may not be a form of paternalism at 
all. ‘Hard paternalism,’ in contrast, is interference with 
voluntary choice and so unquestionably paternalism. 
Voluntariness comes in degrees and depends on such 
factors as how informed the agent is, how well she reasons 
about her available alternatives, how free she is from 
manipulation and external pressure, how free she is 
from internal compulsion, and how calm and collected 
she is. Most behavior, of course, is neither completely 
involuntary nor fully voluntary. The soft–hard categor­
ization is normally supposed to be exhaustive, however, 
and so a line must be drawn between hard and soft at some 
degree of voluntariness. Because of the widespread accep­
tance of soft paternalism and rejection of hard 
paternalism, it is important where this line is drawn. 
Very often, we do not know to what degree some 
behavior we observe is voluntary. Typically, if the beha­
vior is harmful to the agent, it is considered acceptable to 
interfere with him in order to find out to what extent he 
knows what he is doing and whether he intends to do it. 
Such interference, therefore, is often considered a form of 
soft paternalism as well. As with degrees of voluntariness, 
lines must be drawn for what type and degree of uncer­
tainty warrants such inquiring interference. 
If it should be value-neutral, the distinction between 
soft and hard paternalism must be determined indepen­
dently of the seeming reasonableness of the behavior 
under consideration. Naturally, some behavior is so 
senselessly self-destructive that we automatically assume 
involuntariness, such as stepping into the road before an 
oncoming truck. To be sustained, however, the assump­
tion of involuntariness must stand up to closer scrutiny. If 
we persist in classifying some behavior as involuntary or 
possibly involuntary, independently of the mental state 
and practical circumstance of the agent, but only in light 
of its undesirable consequences, then we are imposing our 
own standards of reasonableness on the agent. This may 
perhaps be morally permissible in some situations, but it is 
certainly paternalistic. 
An agent’s degree of voluntariness naturally varies 
over situations. We know more about some things and 
we reason better in some situations. However, the thresh­
old of sufficiently voluntary choice may either be rigid 
over situations or may depend on how much is at stake. As 
an example of the latter, we may require a higher degree 
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voluntary than we require before we allow that giving up 
one’s blood for donation is voluntary. Indeed, the require­
ments in the former case may be so strong that we can in 
practice never be sure that they are fulfilled. 
In legal and medical contexts, voluntariness is often 
discussed in terms of (mental) competence or (decision­
making) capacity. These are generally considered thresh­
old concepts, which makes sense in light of their practical 
implications: Competent or capable persons are consid­
ered qualified to make decisions regarding their own 
treatment as well as their lives more generally. The 
threshold may or may not coincide with the threshold 
between soft and hard paternalism. Definitions of compe­
tence and capacity are normally expected to capture 
whether or not a patient or legal subject should be allowed 
to decide over her own affairs. In that sense, the concepts 
are normative. An alternative approach is to try to keep 
these concepts nonnormative and allow that there may be 
other factors besides the subject’s degree of voluntariness 
that weigh on whether or not she should be allowed to 
make her own decisions. 
The great importance often attributed to the soft– 
hard distinction depends on the assumption that inter­
ference with substantially involuntary behavior is not 
morally problematic, or only marginally so. This 
assumption can be questioned. I may, for example, resist 
interference with my private life even when I act con­
trary to my intentions – due to mistake, confusion, or 
emotion – simply because of a preference against outside 
involvement. When the behavior is harmless or only 
trivially harmful to the agent, such preferences are 
very reasonable and widespread. Moreover, behavior 
that is locally involuntary, so to speak, may still be 
globally voluntary in the sense that the agent considers 
it authentic and in line with her (foolhardy, careless, or 
spontaneous) character. Anti-Paternalism 
Within the broad liberal tradition, paternalism is gener­
ally considered prima facie or pro tanto morally wrong. 
This is the anti-paternalist position or doctrine (although 
the term can also refer to the much stronger position that 
paternalism is always wrong, all things considered). Anti-
paternalism most obviously draws support from the fact 
that paternalism involves some kind of interference with 
individual choice or action. This no doubt gives us a pro 
tanto reason against any action involving paternalism. 
However, paternalism is aimed at protecting or promot­
ing individual good. If the interference fulfills this aim 
and we care about individual good (health, survival, 
finances, and long-term autonomy), this should give us a 
pro tanto reason for the action. Indeed, we may even think that good intentions are good reasons independently of 
effects. At least in cases of effective paternalism, we would 
seem to stand before a moral conflict rather than a moral 
wrong. The anti-paternalist can respond to this observa­
tion in a number of ways. 
The most straightforward defense of anti-paternalism 
is to accept that good-promotion gives us reason for 
action but insist that interference with (sufficiently volun­
tary) choice or action always gives us stronger reason 
against. This may seem reasonable given the liberal 
assumptions that people generally know their own inter­
ests and are the ones most capable to further them. 
However, there are plenty of cases in which minor inter­
ference leads to enormous good, such as when a person is 
forced to step back from the edge of the cliff and is 
thereby saved from certain death, or when a population 
is forced to wear seat belts and thousands of deaths are 
thereby prevented. It seems incredible that our (liberty) 
reasons against interference are stronger than our (survi­
val) reasons for action in such cases. It is true that in many 
cases in which the interference is mild and the benefit 
large, the targeted behavior is not very voluntary. 
However, in other cases, the person is relatively informed 
and rational but happens to make a mistake, is inattentive 
or lazy, or is acting on a passing impulse. 
Another way of defending anti-paternalism is to accept 
that promoting good may sometimes be more important 
than avoiding interference but to claim that interfering 
with a person for her own good entails a special sort of 
insult that goes beyond the interference as such. The 
benevolent motive quite literally adds insult to injury or, 
rather, to interference. This position implies that it is 
better to interfere with a person on a whim, for no special 
reason, than to interfere with her for her sake. This may 
seem implausible, especially for those who want to make 
room for care in ethics, but it could be accepted by 
devoted individualists. Even so, the insult must be very 
large in order to underpin general anti-paternalism, 
because our reasons for interference can be very strong. 
Perhaps what is insulting is not the benevolent inter­
ference as such but, rather, the attitude displayed by the 
paternalist. On some definitions, as previously discussed, 
the paternalist always considers herself in some way 
superior to the person she interferes with. This may 
seem insulting. However, if an interference would benefit 
a person, this must be because something is stopping the 
person from securing this same benefit on her own. The 
paternalist is in fact superior in the specific sense that she 
is more able to produce this benefit. For example, I may 
have brought a pack of cigarettes on a hike in the wild, 
failing to take this chance to quit smoking because it is too 
difficult for me. My friend, on the other hand, may have 
no trouble tossing the package into the mountain stream. 
In general, of course, it is not morally problematic to 
consider oneself more able than others in certain respects. 
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problematic to consider oneself more able to promote a 
person’s good than she herself is. 
The most promising defense of anti-paternalism is 
arguably to point to our often strong reasons against inter­
ference and add some empirical assumptions about our 
tendency to selfishness, corruption, and incompetence 
with regard to benefiting others, especially in institutional 
settings. Although we can sometimes, in theory, benefit 
others by interfering with them, a large enough dose of 
pessimism will entail that whenever we try, we will either 
fail or cause greater harm – for example, by setting danger­
ous precedents, discouraging individual responsibility, or 
strengthening existing power concentrations. 
A final option, of course, is to reject general anti-
paternalism and accept that benevolent interference 
with voluntary choice is sometimes justified, all things 
considered. Anti-paternalism is the doctrine that patern­
alism is always prima facie or pro tanto wrong. If this 
doctrine is false, liberty and autonomy can still be very 
important values, just not values that automatically trump 
other values. Given a strong commitment to liberal 
values, avoiding paternalism will very often be a sensible 
rule of thumb, although it can be set aside when the 
circumstances are grave enough and the means available 
to improve them efficient enough. Legal Paternalism 
The liberal criticism is mainly focused on paternalism by 
the state. When such paternalism is backed up by the 
criminal law, it may be called legal paternalism. Legal 
paternalism most typically consists of prohibitions, such 
as against driving a motorcycle without a helmet or using 
heroin. Economic policy such as taxing and subsidizing 
may also be paternalistic if it is interfering. Examples 
include sin taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and subsidies 
for exercise. Legal paternalism is often impure in that it 
targets consensual interactions, such as assisted suicide or 
the sale of recreational drugs. 
Legal paternalism is special in several respects. The 
state is normally the supreme authority in terms of phy­
sical force within its domain, determining the basic rules 
by which a society functions. On the one hand, this makes 
paternalism by the state especially intrusive because gov­
ernment policy can have far-reaching and comprehensive 
effects on what opportunities are available in society. On 
the other hand, the basic rules of a society partly deter­
mine people’s legitimate expectations, and so limiting 
liberty on this basic level may not upset those expecta­
tions and may in that sense be especially nonintrusive. 
Either way, because the effects of state policy are so far-
reaching, it is important that it should tend to protect and 
promote people’s good. Large Numbers 
Legal paternalism normally affects large numbers of peo­
ple, with no regard for their individual preferences and 
special circumstances. The state may have to limit the 
liberty of all to protect or promote the good of some. For 
example, the state may want to restrict the sale of poten­
tially harmful recreational drugs for which some people 
develop a dangerous addiction (e.g., alcohol). Such cases 
involve not only weighing some people’s liberty against 
their good but also weighing the liberty of some against 
the good of others. If the rationale for a policy is to benefit 
certain people through interference with them (e.g., by 
limiting their access to alcohol), this is undoubtedly 
paternalistic. That other people are also interfered with, 
without further benefit, is simply a negative side effect, 
whether or not it is severe enough to make the policy 
unjust, all things considered. 
People often welcome liberty-limiting policies 
because these policies help them secure important bene­
fits. Examples include seat belt laws and mandatory 
retirement savings. If all those affected welcome a lib­
erty-limiting policy, that policy arguably does not 
involve paternalism. More often, however, only some of 
those affected welcome the policy, making it nonpaterna­
listic for them but paternalistic for the remainder. Such 
cases pose a difficult challenge for action-focused 
accounts of paternalism, which must be fine-tuned to 
determine whether or not a policy is, on the whole, 
paternalistic. The standard approach is to follow the 
motive of the policymakers, judging a policy nonpaterna­
listic if it is intended to benefit the consenters but 
paternalistic if it is intended to benefit the nonconsenters. 
This approach gives no guidance to policymakers who 
intend to benefit all or who simply wonder what their 
intention ought to be in this situation. Also, there remains 
the general problem with defining paternalism in terms of 
motives – namely that on such definitions a policy is 
nonpaternalistic if the policymakers’ motive is not to 
benefit but, for example, to further their own careers, 
even if the policy is accepted and preserved because it 
is generally considered to be justified by the benefits to 
those it interferes with. 
On reason-focused accounts, what is paternalistic is 
invoking some people’s good as a reason for interfering 
with them. If such reasons can be avoided, a policy can be 
enacted without paternalism. In the case of liberty-limit­
ing policies that are welcomed by some but not by all, 
paternalism can be avoided if the benefits to the consen­
ters are large enough to justify the interference with the 
nonconsenters. At least this is true if the consenters con­
sent out of self-interest. If they consent because of the 
benefits to the nonconsenters, they join purposes with the 
policymakers, arguably becoming paternalists themselves 
and further complicating the analysis. 
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feres with a group in order to benefit that group produces 
the benefit for each member through interference with 
other members. This is typically true for policies that are 
not considered paternalistic, such as prohibitions on theft 
and assault – these core elements of the criminal law 
restrict the liberty of everyone, in everyone’s supposed 
best interest. More typical ‘paternalistic’ policies may 
have the same structure: Product safety regulation partly 
aims to protect people from being harmed by each other 
with dangerous products, such as cars or explosives. 
Because legal paternalism involves weighing the inter­
ests of various groups, issues of fairness arise. Those who 
benefit most from a liberty-limiting policy are typically 
the bad choosers – those least able to make decisions 
beneficial for themselves in the absence of interference. 
People who are bad choosers in one area tend to be bad 
choosers in other areas. Therefore, avoiding benevolent 
legal interference will tend to favor the better off at the 
expense of the worse off. Medical Paternalism 
Paternalism is close at hand in medical settings because 
caregivers are normally in a privileged position vis-a`-vis 
their patients. Treatment choices are complex, and 
patients’ decision-making capacity is often impaired. In 
contrast to an earlier acceptance of medical paternalism, 
advocacy of patient autonomy is now the norm in medical 
ethics. Sometimes this is taken to imply that patients 
should always be informed of available treatment options 
and encouraged to actively choose between them. 
However, patient autonomy may also be respected by 
allowing patients to choose not to get informed but, rather, 
trust their caregiver or their families to decide for them. 
There are good practical (consequentialist) reasons to 
respect patient autonomy. Like any person, a patient is 
most likely to know her own circumstances and preferences, 
including non-health-related circumstances such as her 
family responsibilities and financial situation, which the care­
giver may not know anything about. Adding to the general 
instrumental and possibly intrinsic value of autonomous 
choice, patients have to some extent lost control over their 
own lives and bodies and so have an extra need to re­
establish their sense of self-direction. Also, adherence and 
thus effective treatment is promoted by some respect for 
patient autonomy. Furthermore, at least in modern, indivi­
dualist societies, trust and respect in the relationship between 
caregiver and patient generally make people more likely to 
seek treatment and more receptive to recommendations. 
On the other hand, the medical context provides 
ample examples of how interference can be beneficial. 
Generally able people can refuse best treatment because 
they are anxious or upset, because they mistrust their doctors, because they are misinformed or make mistakes, 
or simply because they fail to bring themselves to accept a 
risky or painful procedure. 
Several ethical codes and declarations after World 
War II have emphasized the importance of informed 
consent, first to participation in research and later also 
to treatment. Early on, informed consent served mainly as 
protection against exploitation and misconduct. Over 
time, it became increasingly more integrated with respect 
for patient autonomy. Today, asking patients to give 
informed consent is standard procedure, but it has been 
criticized for inefficiency, for failing to protect autonomy, 
and for inducing caregivers to shrink from their profes­
sional responsibility. The formal use of informed consent 
forms should be distinguished from actual consent by 
informed people, whether or not the former is intended 
to capture the latter. 
Medical paternalism in institutional settings is much like 
legal paternalism in that it targets groups with little possi­
bility for individual variation. However, medical 
paternalism is also a feature of personal relationships 
between individual caregivers and their patients. 
Relationships can be openly paternalistic in that the care­
giver assumes the role of benevolent authority, issuing well-
intended directives and expecting to be obeyed. 
Relationships can also be secretively paternalistic in that 
caregivers manipulate patients for their own good, for 
example by mixing medicine into food or drink. In both 
cases, an alternative is an equal and honest relationship in 
which caregiver and patient reason together about the 
available options and perhaps even make decisions together. 
What is the right approach in a certain situation depends on 
whether anti-paternalism is a correct doctrine and on what 
is the value of health, of equality, and of self-direction. 
See also: Advance Directives; Autonomy; Euthanasia 
(Physician-Assisted Suicide); Informed Consent; 
Liberalism; Public Health Ethics; Right to Know and Right 
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